China’s Second Generation of Left-behind Children

In March 2024, the shocking murder of a 13-year-old boy in Hebei province, allegedly by three classmates, triggered fierce debates on Chinese social media about juvenile crime and the plight of millions of left-behind children 留守儿童. One consequence of China’s mass rural-to-urban migration since the 1980s is an increase in family separation and a rise in left-behind children. The term refers to children younger than 18 years old who remain with either one parent or, where both parents migrate, other caregivers. While statistics vary, the most recent estimate, from 2020, suggests there are more than 60 million left-behind children, mostly residing in rural areas.^[1] Since 2010, a new generation of urban left-behind children is emerging in smaller cities as well. Although conditions vary among families as well as regions, family separation is emotionally hard for the children and caregivers who remain. It is also tough on the migrant parents, who see themselves as making difficult sacrifices for their children’s future.

Research since the 1990s reveals two distinct generations of left-behind children. The first generation consisted of children born in the 1980s and 1990s. During this period most rural migrants were male, and both migration distances and duration were relatively short. In addition, parents typically did not leave the village until their children were at school. The second generation are children born after 2000. Since then, more women, including mothers, have migrated out of the villages, and migration distances and durations have also been longer than with the parents of the first generation. As a result, more left-behind children are being raised by grandparents or other relatives. In addition, parents are separating from their children at an earlier age. For instance, the percentage of zero-to-two-year-olds who remain in a village without their parents has sharply increased from the first to second generation.^[2] Compared to the first generation of left-behind children, the second generation has access to higher levels of technology and communications such as the internet and cell phones. This is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, children and caregivers enjoy greater communication with migrant parents; on the other hand, unrestrained use of social media and online gaming can have a negative influence on the left-behind children.

The generational differences of left-behind children have many variations. We focus here on the age of children when parents migrate and duration of parental migration, the make-up of caregivers (single parents, grandparents, other relatives and schools) and the availability of social media and the internet for children, caregivers and migrant parents.

Leaving them younger, staying away longer

The parents of the second generation leave them when they are younger and for longer periods. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, both parents tend to be at home for the first year or two of a child’s life, and it was typically fathers who left the village for work.^[3] In addition, those who left tended to seek off-farm employment closer to home. This was due to the strict hukou (household registration) system that limited migration to cities, as well as the country’s greater reliance on agriculture. Yet, after 2000, central and local party governments began to enact limited hukou reform that allowed rural people greater employment opportunities in cities. As a result, both men and women started to migrate greater distances and for longer periods. They tended to leave younger children in the village while bringing older children with them to the cities for better educational opportunities.^[4]

Parental absence at an earlier age can have an adverse effect on early childhood development. Studies find that the absence of the mother in particular has a negative effect on the cognitive development and nutrition of rural children younger than two.^[5] Rural children have delayed development outcomes compared to their urban counterparts, but it is more pronounced when mothers separate from their children within their first two years. Many studies find that parental migration has a significantly negative impact on the children’s education, resulting in lower test scores, worse school enrolment and fewer years of schooling overall.^[6] Children’s middle-school academic performance improves when migrant parents return home.^[7] More second-generation children migrate with their parents to the cities for better educational opportunities and attend urban high schools.

Stay-behind caregivers

The first generation of left-behind children typically stayed with their mother and grandparents. The women who remained in the village looked after the children as well as grandparents, the house and the farmland. During this period, almost every village had an elementary school, and there was a middle school in a nearby town or county. As more rural women entered the urban workforce, more fathers stayed behind, caring for both children and grandparents. The roughly 20 million left-behind children in 2000 represented 13 percent of rural children between the ages of 0 to 17.^[8] By 2010, 47 percent of the left-behind children did not live with either parent.^[9] In 2020, it was 46 percent.^[10] However, those living only with their father rose from 17 percent in 2010 to 24 percent while those living only with their mother fell from 36 percent in 2010 to 30 percent ten years later. The largest spike was for children living alone or with other children: from 3 percent in 2010 to 13 percent in 2020.

More students of elementary-school age, some as young as 7, have had to live in school dorms since rural elementary schools have closed or consolidated, a trend that started in the early 2000s and escalated after 2010. The boarding school experience is correlated with poorer educational and health outcomes for these rural students.^[11] Compared to non-boarding rural students, boarders tend to have lower test scores, higher rates of anaemia and higher levels of learning anxiety and loneliness. When both parents are living in a distant city or even another province, the effect is even more exacerbated. Interviews with students in boarding schools reflect this problem. An 11-year-old who lives in a dorm, sleeps in a room with 15 classmates and shares a bed says, ‘It is hard to concentrate, and I have to ask the older classmates for help with my studies.’ Moreover, he cannot visit his parents every weekend like most of his classmates in the dorm.^[12]

Left-behind children and the digital revolution

The rapid development of telecommunication technology has transformed the experience of both left-behind children and their parents. For the first generation, and into the early 2000s, landlines and mobile phones helped children connect with their migrant parents, but many poor rural migrant families, especially in inland provinces, had to rely on occasional calls put through to a school office phone or neighbour’s mobile.^[13] Local governments, with support from non-profit organisations, sponsored ‘family-connection phone rooms’ 亲情电话屋 in rural schools or villages.^[14] In contrast, the second generation has had wider access to mobiles, including smart phones, and the internet. A survey by the Research Centre for Rural Affairs (RCRA) at Wuhan University revealed that 40 percent of left-behind children have their own mobile phones, while 49 percent use their caregiver’s phone.^[15] Migrant parents can contact their children regularly using text, voice and video calls or even closed-circuit television.^[16] While distant parenting is not ideal, the technology allows for a greater emotional connection. Recent interviews with children who have parents living away from home suggest that the frequency of calls can make a difference. One girl tells us that she talks to her parents by video phone every day and feels close to family. Yet another boy rarely talks with his parents over the phone, and he feels he has no connection with his parents.^[17]

Although frequent contact is positive, the use of the internet and smartphones presents new challenges for migrant parents and caregivers. Watching short videos and playing games are the main online entertainment activities for these children, accounting for 69 percent and 33 percent, respectively. According to the Research Centre for Rural Affairs (RCRA) report, more than half the students in a sixth-grade class in Jiangxi Province spend more than ten hours on their smartphones at home during weekends. A middle-school teacher in the same province notes that students spend weekends on their smartphones instead of studying, often leaving homework incomplete. Many teachers report that students are ‘staying up late for two days at home and sleeping for five days at school, with no intention to learn’. Rural left-behind children are more than twice as likely to develop internet addiction than their counterparts with parents at home.^[18] The RCRA also found that 67 percent of migrant parents worried that their children were addicted to their mobiles, with 21 percent of parents considering the situation to be ‘very serious’.^[19] As elsewhere, studies show that smartphone dependence can adversely affect left-behind children’s physical and mental health and negatively influence their academic performance.^[20]

Hukou reform and rise of urban left-behind children

Since the inception of the hukou system in 1958, rural people living in cities have faced institutional discrimination in areas including employment, access to public education, health care and housing. The hukou reform that began in the early 2000s has had a significant influence on migrant parents and their children, offering increasing access to public education. Starting in 2000, the State Council has given rural migrants increased opportunities to convert their household registration status from rural to urban and enjoy the associated social benefits. However, these policies have been unevenly adopted at the subprovincial and municipal levels. Although the central government has emphasised that local governments provide migrant children with access to public education, many cities have set up barriers that make access difficult, such as requiring various forms of registration or fees.^[21]

Another way municipal governments control migration and education is through home ownership. High school education in China is not compulsory, and to enrol, students must take an entrance exam. To qualify for the exam, there is an official registration process that may require an urban hukou as well as proof of their parents’ home ownership.^[22] Many migrant parents have therefore left younger children behind in rural areas until they can afford to purchase an urban apartment to meet such requirements. Even then, it is challenging for migrant students to compete for a limited number of places with urban peers who have enjoyed better primary and secondary education and then, if accepted into an urban high school, to keep up with their classmates.

The hukou reforms have contributed to a generational shift in the number of urban left-behind children, from 3 million in 2000 to more than 20 million in 2010 and 25 million in 2020, the last out of an estimated total of 67 million.^[23] Since 2000, we have observed a new generation of urban left-behind children who generally belong to one of two categories: children who were born in smaller cities (county seats) with one or both parents migrating to larger cities for work, or children born in the countryside who have moved to a smaller county seat but whose parents work in larger cities.

While urban children traditionally have access to better health care and education than children in rural areas, recent studies find that urban children who are living with caregivers instead of their parents or just living with one parent experience greater mental health problems and substance abuse than urban children living with both parents.^[24] The reasons include greater isolation and lack of parental supervision. In addition, studies suggest that the children of migrant workers in cities are more likely to be bullied as well as bully other children.^[25] For numerous reasons, compared to other urban children, those with migrant worker parents exhibit poorer physical and mental health, lower test scores and weaker school attachment, and they are more prone to smoking and drinking. They also tend to have more mental health problems and higher rates of substance use than their rural counterparts.

Overall, the disadvantages left-behind children face, combined with lower cognitive and educational outcomes, can have serious consequences, including the propensity to engage in risky behaviour and to commit crimes.^[26] A 2018 prison survey of 2,670 inmates conducted by the Center for Experimental Economics in Education (CEEE) at Shaanxi Normal University shows that 23 percent of the inmates surveyed were the children of migrant workers. The data also suggests that inmates who had been left behind as children were more likely to have committed crimes in their youth as well as more violent crimes as adults than inmates who grew up with both parents. In fact, statistics show a rise in violent crime among juveniles as well as several high-profile cases of heinous crimes in which the perpetrators and victims are under 16 years old.^[27] Of course, most children who were raised by grandparents or one parent have not committed serious crimes or are incarcerated, but now, as researchers, we are observing how this experience influences adults and even their own children.

Conclusion

The first generation of left-behind children are now adults, many with their own children. While previous research examined the emotional, cognitive and health differences between children living with both parents as opposed to single parents or other caregivers, recent research is exploring how the experience of being left behind influences the behaviour and opportunities of adults. This includes types of employment, unemployment and incarceration. Recent research suggests that adults whose parents were migrant workers are more likely to have less schooling and lower cognitive test scores as well as significantly poorer socioeconomic status.^[28]

Future research may focus on several areas. First is on how the experiences of urban dwellers compare with those in rural families, especially in the context of continued urbanisation. Second is how the experience of left-behind children influences their health and behaviour as adults and whether there are any gender differences. For instance, most of the prison studies that examine the left behind experience tend to use male inmate samples and interviews. One future area of study is to include female inmates and the left behind experience. Third, given that male left-behind children come from poorer rural areas, and enjoy less or poorer quality education and limited employment prospects, they are more likely to become involuntary bachelors (‘bare branches’ 光棍), exerting greater pressure on rural social welfare systems in the future. Finally, the perspectives of migrant parents, caregivers and the children themselves should be incorporated into future studies.^[29] For instance, a recent interview with rural children of elementary school age, whose parents have migrated out of their village for most of the year, illuminates some of the feelings around bullying from the child’s perspective.^[30] ‘When your parents are away, you can feel timid, lonely and afraid’, says a sixth-grade stay-behind girl. These children may be easy targets for bullies. Moreover, she says that ‘these children are afraid to tell their caregivers or parents that they are being bullied’. When bullies think they can get away with tormenting another child, it might continue until it is too late. When asked how to resolve the situation, she said, ‘Students and teachers need to be more proactive in letting children with migrant parents know it is OK to tell teachers and other relatives what is happening.’ Thus, even for national discussions on bullying and left-behind children, including the most vulnerable voices could contribute to a solution.

Notes

[1] National Bureau of Statistics of China, UNICEF China and UNFPA China, ‘What the 2020 census can tell us about children in China: Facts and figures’, April 2023, online at: https://www.unicef.cn/en/reports/population-status-children-china-2020-census

[2] Ibid.

[3] Biao Xiang, ‘How far are the left‐behind left behind? A preliminary study in rural China’, Population, Space and Place, vol. 13, no. 3 (2007): 179–91.

[4] National Bureau of Statistics of China, UNICEF China and UNFPA China, ‘What the 2020 census can tell us about children in China’.

[5] Ai Yue, Yu Bai, Yaojiang Shi, Renfu Luo, Scott Rozelle, Alexis Medina and Sean Sylvia, ‘Parental migration and early childhood development in rural China’, Demography, vol. 57, no. 2 (2020): 403–22.

[6] Ming-Hsuan Lee, ‘Migration and children’s welfare in China: The schooling and health of children left behind’, Journal of Developing Areas, vol. 44, no. 2 (2011): 165–82. Minhui Zhou, Rachel Murphy and Ran Tao, ‘Effects of parents’ migration on the education of children left behind in rural China’, Population and Development Review, vol. 40, no. 2 (2014): 273–92.

[7] Zhiqiang Liu, Li Yu and Xiang Zheng, ‘No longer left-behind: The impact of return migrant parents on children’s performance’, China Economic Review, vol. 49 (2018): 184–96.

[8] National Bureau of Statistics of China, UNICEF China and UNFPA China, ‘What the 2010 census can tell us about children in China: Facts and figures’, October 2014, online at: https://www.unicef.cn/en/reports/census-data-about-children-china-2013

[9] Ibid.

[10] National Bureau of Statistics of China, UNICEF China and UNFPA China, ‘What the 2020 census can tell us about children in China’.

[11] Aiqin Wang, Alexis Medina, Renfu Luo, Yaojiang Shi and Ai Yue, ‘To board or not to board: Evidence from nutrition, health and education outcomes of students in rural China’, China and World Economy, vol. 24, no. 3 (2016): 52–66.

[12] Interview, October 2015, Shaanxi province.

[13] Janice Hua Xu, ‘Media discourse on cell phone technology and “left-behind children” in China’, Global Media Journal, vol. 9, no. 1 (2016): 87–102.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Research Centre for Rural Affairs (RCRA) Wuhan University, ‘Nongcun Liushou Ertong Shouji Chenmi Wenti Diaocha Yu Duice Jianyi’ [Rural left-behind children’s mobile phone addiction: Problem investigation and countermeasure suggestions], 10 February 2023, online at: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/zzHnpW0fRZ1gWCUw6tTMHw

[16] Jiamei Tang, Ke Wang and Yuming Luo, ‘The bright side of digitisation: Assessing the impact of mobile phone domestication on left-behind children in China’s rural migrant families’, Frontiers in Psychology, vol. 13 (2022): 1003379; and Na Liu, ‘CCTV cameras at home: Temporality experience of surveillance technology in family life’, New Media and Society (2024): 1–21.

[17] Interview, July 2024, Elementary School in Shaanxi province conducted through the CEEE.

[18] Jingjing Cai, Yun Wang, Feng Wang, Jingjing Lu, Lu Li and Xudong Zhou, ‘The association of parent–child communication with internet addiction in left-behind children in China: A cross-sectional study’, International Journal of Public Health, vol. 66 (2021): 630700.

[19] Research Centre for Rural Affairs (RCRA) Wuhan University, ‘Nongcun Liushou Ertong Shouji Chenmi Wenti Diaocha Yu Duice Jianyi’ [Rural left-behind children’s mobile phone addiction: Problem investigation and countermeasure suggestions].

[20] Ibid.; and Rui Zhen, Lu Li, Yi Ding, Wei Hong and Ru-De Liu, ‘How does mobile phone dependency impair academic engagement among Chinese left-behind children?’, Children and Youth Services Review, vol. 116 (2020): 105169.

[21] Jia Wu and Junsen Zhang, ‘Suiqian Zinv Ruxue Xianzhi, Ertong Liushou yu Chengshi Laodongli Gongji’ [Barriers to school education for migrant children, being left behind and urban labor supply], Jingji Yanjiu [Economic Research Journal], vol. 55, no. 11 (2020): 138–55.

[22] Tiantian Liu, ‘Real‐estate boom, commodification and crises of social reproductive institutions in rural China’, Development and Change, vol. 54, no. 3 (2023): 543–69; and Eli Friedman, The Urbanisation of People: The Politics of Development, Labor Markets, and Schooling in the Chinese City. New York: Columbia University Press, 2022.

[23] National Bureau of Statistics of China, UNICEF China and UNFPA China, ‘What the 2010 census can tell us about children in China’. National Bureau of Statistics of China, UNICEF China and UNFPA China, ‘What the 2020 census can tell us about children in China’.

[24] Feng Wang, Leesa Lin, Jingjing Lu, Jingjing Cai, Jiayao Xu and Xudong Zhou, ‘Mental health and substance use in urban left-behind children in China: A growing problem’, Children and Youth Services Review, vol. 116 (2020): 105135; Nan Lu, Wenting Lu, Renxing Chen and Wanzhi Tang, ‘The causal effects of urban-to-urban migration on left-behind children’s well-being in China’, International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, vol. 20, no. 5 (2023): 4303.

[25] Yoichiro Otake, Xiaoqun Liu and Xuerong Luo, ‘Involvement in bullying among left-behind children in provincial Chinese cities: The role of perceived emotional support’, Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment and Trauma, vol. 28, no. 8 (2019): 943–57; Huiping Zhang, Peilian Chi, Haili Long and Xiaoying Ren, ‘Bullying victimisation and depression among left-behind children in rural China: Roles of self-compassion and hope’, Child Abuse and Neglect, vol. 96 (2019):104072.

[26] Lisa Cameron, Xin Meng and Dandan Zhang, ‘Does being “left–behind” in childhood lead to criminality in adulthood? Evidence from data on rural–urban migrants and prison inmates in China’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation, vol. 202 (2022): 675–93.

[27] Nanfang Metropolis Daily, ‘Shinian Shuju Kan Wei Chengnianren Fanzui: Shezui Shaonian He Tezheng? Xiaoyuan Qiling Duolema?’ [A decade of data on juvenile crime: What are the characteristics of offending youth? Has school bullying increased?], 27 March 2024, online at: https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1794641555396609242&wfr=spider&for=pc

[28] Xiaodong Zheng, Zuyi Fang, Yajun Wang and Xiangming Fang, ‘When left-behind children become adults and parents: The long-term human capital consequences of parental absence in China’, China Economic Review, vol. 74 (2022): 101821.

[29] For an excellent example see: Rachel Murphy, The Children of China’s Great Migration. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020; Rachel Murphy, ‘What does “left behind” mean to children living in migratory regions in rural China?’, Geoforum, vol. 129 (2022): 181–90.

[30] Interview, July 2024, Elementary School in Shaanxi province conducted through the CEEE.